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OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE:
UNWARRANTED EXPANSION OF
18 U.S.C. § 1512(C)(1)
SARAH O’ROURKE SCHRUP*
This Article suggests that prosecutors are misusing and courts are
misinterpreting the Sarbanes–Oxley obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c)(1). As a result, the statute is being applied far beyond the
corporate fraud or even general fraud context to conduct that Congress
never intended to punish with this statute. Such an expansive interpretation
lays bare the ambiguity inherent in the statutory language. A proper
statutory construction that explores the statute itself, related provisions,
canons of construction, the legislative history, and the investigatory process
at the Securities and Exchange Commission shows that Congress could not
have intended the limitless sweep of the statute that some courts and
prosecutors have fashioned. In fact, an expansive definition of the terms
within § 1512(c)(1) carries with it a host of unintended and unwanted
results. Specifically, such an interpretation is at odds with congressional
intent, creates absurdities and unfair sentencing disparities, renders the
statute void for vagueness, and encourages judicial and executive
legislating.
Courts should recognize and limit efforts to expand
§ 1512(c)(1)’s reach.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the 2001 and 2002 accounting scandals involving
corporate luminaries such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and
Adelphia, Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Act).1
Although the Act’s preamble is clear that the bill was designed to “protect
investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures
*
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Article.
1
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; see Jonathan D.
Glater, From Investor Fury, a Legal Bandwagon, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2002, at B1.
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made pursuant to the securities laws,”2 prosecutors have since its enactment
endeavored to expand its reach far beyond the corporate fraud context.
Specifically, prosecutors have used its obstruction of justice provision in 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) in a host of other types of cases, including gardenvariety drug possession,3 police misconduct,4 and even when a defendant
burned the body of a murder victim to conceal his crime.5 And courts,
perhaps unwittingly, have sanctioned this expansive use of § 1512(c)(1)’s
provisions. This expansion is not only unsupportable under a proper
construction of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, but it creates absurdities in
application and renders the statute void for vagueness.
This Article posits that courts should reject prosecutorial efforts to
expand the reach of Sarbanes–Oxley into drug crimes, which are clearly
beyond its plain terms and the legislature’s intent. A proper construction of
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act generally shows that
Congress intended to combat corporate fraud—or at most fraud generally—
and not other types of crimes. Part II of the Article conducts an in-depth
statutory construction of § 1512(c)(1) by reviewing its language, structure,
related provisions, canons of construction, legislative history, and the
traditional SEC investigations process. Part III then examines how
prosecutors have used, and courts have interpreted, § 1512(c)(1) in the ten
years since its enactment. In Part IV, the Article demonstrates how this
unwarranted expansion of § 1512(c)(1) leads to absurd and unintended
results, and is wrong as a matter of policy. And Part V concludes by
arguing that the government should abandon its use of § 1512(c)(1) beyond
fraud crimes.
II. THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF § 1512(C)(1)
Section 1512(c)(1) criminalizes an individual’s conduct if that person
“corruptly—alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or
other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”6 As discussed in
more detail below,7 this provision suffers from at least two textual
ambiguities. First, the scope of the phrase “other object” is uncertain.
Second, the specificity and temporal reach of the “official proceeding”
impacts the statute’s breadth. Although a statute’s plain, unambiguous
2

Id. pmbl.
See infra Part III.
4
See United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2007).
5
See United States v. Green, No. 5:06CR-19-R, 2008 WL 4000870, at *1, *11 (W.D.
Ky. Aug. 26, 2008).
6
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (2006).
7
See infra Part III.
3
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language definitively settles its meaning,8 when statutory language is
susceptible to two or more meanings, courts look to interpretive aids to
discern congressional intent.9 The plainness or ambiguity of statutory
language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.10 If an ambiguity persists, an act’s structure and context,
canons of construction, and legislative history assist courts in resolving it.11
When read in the context of the Act’s preamble and the related sections
along with the legislative history and relevant canons of construction, it
becomes clear that § 1512(c)(1) was aimed at preventing corporations from
destroying records relevant to federal securities investigations and was not
intended to be an omnibus dragnet for a wide assortment of other non-fraud
crimes.12
A. THE STATUTE’S STRUCTURE AND CONTEXT

The structure of the surrounding provisions in the obstruction of
justice (OOJ) chapter of Title 18 provides insight into the best interpretation
of § 1512(c)(1), an add-on provision that was enacted, at least in part, to fill
gaps in the existing obstruction statutes.13 This Section evaluates the
statute’s structure in four parts: (i) the Act’s preamble; (ii) the preSarbanes–Oxley provisions; (iii) the post-Sarbanes–Oxley provisions; and
(iv) one additional OOJ provision in Chapter 109 of Title 18.

8

See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
9
See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685–86 (1985) (finding that the
sale of all outstanding stock in a lumber company constituted a sale of securities under the
plain language meaning of the Securities Act of 1933).
10
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991).
For this reason, arguments that the statute is unambiguous because the terms “object” and
“proceeding” used in § 1512(c)(1) are easily defined cannot overcome the apparent
ambiguity that arises from its virtually limitless reach and its resulting incompatibility with
surrounding provisions.
11
See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 519–20 (2009) (noting the importance of
statutory structure); Landreth Timber, 471 U.S. at 685 (finding it is “axiomatic that ‘[t]he
starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself’”)
(quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring)); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91 (1989) (noting that the legislative
history is instructive in determining the reasonableness of statutory attorney’s fees); Price v.
Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427 (1899) (relying in part on the preamble for statutory construction
of an ambiguous statute).
12
And, as discussed below, see infra Part II.B.3, statutory ambiguity still inures to a
criminal defendant’s benefit under the rule of lenity.
13
S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002).
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1. The Act’s Preamble
The first clue Congress provided that § 1512(c)(1) was narrowly
tailored towards corporate fraud is located in the Act’s preamble. In fact,
Congress could not have been clearer about the behavior it intended to
capture under the Sarbanes–Oxley criminal provisions. The Act’s preamble
explicitly states that the bill was designed to “protect investors by
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to securities laws.”14 Although some courts may give short shrift
to an Act’s preamble, it nonetheless represents the very first words out of
Congress’s mouth about the purpose and scope of the Act. In this case, the
preamble explicitly refers to the limited types of behavior captured by the
criminal provisions in Sarbanes–Oxley.15
2. Provisions Surrounding § 1512(c)
Examining the companion provisions in the OOJ chapter16 establishes
at least three broad precepts that guide statutory interpretation and shed
light on legislative intent with respect to § 1512(c)(1). First, all of the
provisions are limited in either temporal scope or substantive subject
matter. This limitation indicates that Congress intended to proscribe a
limited set of conduct in narrowly defined parameters. For example,
§§ 1516–1518 criminalize obstructions of only a few certain types of
investigations: federal audits, bank examinations, and health care offenses.17
Similarly, § 1519 limits itself to the destruction, alteration, or falsification
of records during federal investigations.18
Significantly, even for those provisions whose titles are worded more
broadly, the actual statutory language contains specific limits on the
conduct to which it applies. In § 1510, for example, which is titled broadly
“Obstruction of criminal investigations,” the conduct actually criminalized
is limited to: (1) those who use bribes to obstruct or delay the delivery of
information to an investigator; (2) bank officers who alert customers to
audits; or (3) insurance agents who alert customers to investigations.19
Similarly, § 1511 is called “Obstruction of State or local law enforcement,”
but its application is limited to those who facilitate illegal gambling
14

Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, pmbl., 116 Stat. 745, 745.
Id.
16
18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
17
§§ 1516–1518. Section 1516 discusses “Obstruction of Federal audit”; § 1517,
“Obstructing examination of financial institution”; and § 1518, “Obstruction of criminal
investigations of health care offenses.”
18
§ 1519 (discussing “[d]estruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal
investigations and bankruptcy”).
19
§ 1510.
15
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businesses.20
Thus, there simply is not a limitless omnibus obstruction provision
within this chapter, even though Congress could have easily created one
that captured all aspects of all federal investigations and judicial and
administrative proceedings.21 Even § 1519, a broadly worded provision
specifically enacted as a catchall to include investigations and not just
official proceedings,22 limits itself to “records,” a distinct limit on its use to
prosecute, for instance, drug or gun crimes.23
The second general precept that can be gleaned from a study of the
OOJ provisions as a whole is that § 1512, “Tampering with a witness,
victim, or an informant,” which contains a number of discrete subsections,
was designed to punish those who tamper with witnesses through threats,
violence, or bribery in order to prevent testimony or production of
documents.24 Thus, Congress was concerned in this section with protecting
witnesses and victims as well as the integrity of the judicial proceedings
that rely on this documentary evidence often as the sole proof of
wrongdoing.25
The placement of the Sarbanes–Oxley language in § 1512(c)(1) means
that it should be read as criminalizing similar, serious conduct that impacts
witnesses and victims and threatens the integrity of the proceedings. Under
such a reading, destroying drugs during a bust or ditching a firearm during a
police chase falls well outside of its ambit. It is true that “[w]hen § 1512
20

§ 1511.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (the Necessary and Proper clause); United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (noting that the Necessary and Proper clause
“grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation”).
22
See infra note 127.
23
§ 1519 (criminalizing “[d]estruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal
investigations and bankruptcy” and allowing prosecution of persons who have “the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under
Title 11” (emphasis added)).
24
§ 1512; see, e.g., § 1512(a)(1) (proscribing the killing of “another person, with intent
to—prevent the attendance of testimony of any person in an official proceeding”);
§ 1512(b)(1) (prohibiting knowing intimidation, threats, and corrupt persuasion of another
person “with intent to—influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an
official proceeding”).
25
See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. 12,915, 12,950 (2002) (“[The Act] provides tough new
criminal penalties to restore accountability and transparency in our markets. It accomplishes
this in three ways: punishing criminals who commit fraud, preserving evidence to prove
fraud, and protecting victims of fraud.”) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). As discussed
below, the legislative history of § 1512(c)(1) confirms this view as the legislators
consistently emphasized the importance of protecting victims of corporate fraud and
whistleblowers by requiring preservation of evidence that is the best, and sometimes only,
proof of wrongdoing. See infra Part II.C.
21
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was first enacted in 1982, it was not limited to the white-collar crime
context,”26 even though those earlier provisions also used the phrase
“record, document, or other object.”27 As a threshold matter, that courts
have interpreted similar language in the witness tampering provision
broadly does not necessarily mean that Congress intended its later-enacted
Sarbanes–Oxley provision to be similarly sweeping.28 Moreover, the
differences between subsections (a)(2) and (c)(1), as well as Congress’s
clearly stated motives in enacting Sarbanes–Oxley,29 intimates that
Congress may not have intended them to be interpreted in lockstep.30
Third, the sentencing structure contained within the OOJ chapter
likewise provides clues to Congress’s intent with respect to § 1512(c)(1).
Most of the sections provide for a maximum five-year sentence, which
seems commensurate with the criminalized conduct—falsifying documents,
failing to comply with investigative demands, bribing or tipping during
investigations, and interfering with audits.31 Only a small handful of
sections provide for substantially higher sentences in the twenty- to thirtyyear range, and these are provisions implicating death, violence, or the
integrity of the entire proceeding.32 The severity of these sentences
26

United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 603 (7th Cir. 2011).
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 4(a), 96 Stat. 1248,
1249 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)).
28
1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:5 (7th ed. June 2011) (“Two statutory provisions containing similar or
identical language are not necessarily subject to the same interpretation, as there are other
interpretive factors such as the purpose and context of the legislation, and legislative
history.”).
29
Id.; see also infra Part II.C.
30
Subsection (a)(2) requires serious conduct involving the safety and sanctity of another,
whereas the conduct in (c)(1) is focused solely on the defendant herself. In addition, the fact
that (a)(2) focuses on witness tampering confirms the temporal limits of the provision’s
reach to only actual, extant judicial proceedings. Given that some courts have now
interpreted the “official proceeding” language in (c)(1) as encompassing even fledgling
investigations, see, e.g., Johnson, 655 F.3d at 607, it would be anomalous to superimpose a
definition of a phrase from another statute that is much more limited in scope.
31
The following offenses require the offender to pay a fine or be imprisoned not more
than five years, or both: § 1505 (obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies,
and committees), § 1506 (theft or alteration of record or process; false bail), § 1510
(obstruction of criminal investigations), § 1516 (obstruction of federal audits), § 1517
(obstructing examination of financial institution), and § 1518 (obstruction of criminal
investigations of health care offenses). Section 1505 has an additional provision allowing a
sentence of up to eight years “if the offense involves international or domestic terrorism.”
32
Attempted murder or the use of physical force when violating § 1512 carries a thirtyyear sentence, while the threat of physical force carries a twenty-year sentence. § 1512
(tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant). Sections 1513 (retaliating against a
witness, victim, or an informant) and 1519 (destruction, alteration, or falsification of records
in Federal investigations and bankruptcy) also carry twenty- to thirty-year sentences.
27
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necessarily implies a more limited intended application.33
That Congress chose to create criminal obstruction provisions in
§§ 1512(c)(1), 1519, and 1520 as a part of Sarbanes–Oxley and then
decided to place them alongside the most serious crimes within the OOJ
chapter with similarly serious sentences shows that Congress was
concerned with more than mere insular evidence destruction or small-scale
roadblocks to garden-variety criminal investigations. Rather, Congress
seemingly analogized the impact of widespread document destruction in a
corporate fraud case as equivalent to threatening or harming a witness or
preventing the wholesale administration of justice. Put simply, the broad
public impact of these crimes raised the stakes and required more serious
punishment than other obstructive acts contained within the same chapter.
3. Provisions Added by Sarbanes–Oxley
Not only do the preexisting obstruction of justice provisions shed light
on congressional intent, but a comparison of the provisions added to the
OOJ chapter by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act reinforces the limited applicability
of § 1512(c)(1) to either corporate fraud cases, fraud cases generally, or
cases in which a specific judicial proceeding was underway or imminent.34
Sarbanes–Oxley added four provisions to the OOJ chapter: § 1512(c)(1),
§ 1513(e), § 1519, and § 1520.35 The Department of Justice summarizes the
new criminal provisions as follows:
[Section 1519] expands existing law . . . [and] explicitly reaches activities by an
individual “in relation to or contemplation of” any matters. No corrupt persuasion is
required. New Section 1519 should be read in conjunction with [1512(c)(1)] . . .
which similarly bars corrupt acts to destroy, alter, mutilate or conceal evidence, in
contemplation of an “official proceeding.” Accountants who fail to retain the audit or
review work papers of a covered audit for a period of 5 years will violate Section
1520 . . . . New subsection (e) of 18 U.S.C. § 1513 creates a felony offense for any

33

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2) (2006) (increasing maximum penalty from fifteen to
twenty-five years if serious bodily injury occurs during a carjacking); § 3553(a)(2)(A)
(advising district courts to consider the seriousness of the offense in imposing the sentence);
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (providing for a higher sentence if “death or serious bodily
injury results from the use of” a prohibited substance). See also United States v. Stewart,
590 F.3d 93, 172 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Congress expressly mandated that the Sentencing
Commission provide for a terrorism enhancement to ensure that crimes of terrorism were
met with a punishment that reflects their extraordinary seriousness.”).
34
See Attachment to Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Field
Guidance on New Criminal Authorities Enacted in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (H.R.
3763) Concerning Corporate Fraud and Accountability (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Attachment to Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft], available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/sarox1.htm.
35
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 1102, 1107, 802, 116 Stat. 745,
807, 810, 800–01 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(1), 1513(e), 1519–1520 (2006)).
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person knowingly to take any action, with intent to retaliate, harmful to a person who
36
provides such information concerning a federal offense.

First, as a threshold matter, the obstruction of justice provisions
codified at §§ 1519 and 1520 were inserted into Title VIII of the Act, which
carried the short title “Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability.”37
Meanwhile, the obstruction of justice provision codified at § 1512(c) was
inserted into Title XI of the Act, which carried the short title “Corporate
Fraud Accountability.”38 So although §§ 1519 and 1520 cast a wider net
beyond corporate fraud into the more general criminal fraud, § 1512(c)(1)
was limited to corporate fraud.
There is an additional, significant titular difference between §§ 1512
and 1519. Section 1519 is entitled “Destruction, alteration, or falsification
of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy.” The use of the term
“record” in the title is significant and signals Congress’s intent to limit the
provision’s reach to fraud crimes and perhaps even to the corporate fraud
context.39 Significantly, a title may limit the scope of an act, but it cannot
broaden it.40 Indeed, courts and commentators have recognized that when
the text of a statute is broader than its title, some or all of that provision will
be invalid.41 Thus, even though the short titles of these provisions are not
dispositive and cannot be considered in the absence of a textual ambiguity,
the titles nonetheless provide further evidence that Congress intended
§ 1512(c)(1) to be narrowly construed.
Section 1519 carries one other critical difference from § 1512(c)(1)
because it encompasses “investigation or proper administration of any
matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States,”42 whereas § 1512(c)(1) is limited to “official proceeding[s].”43 As
relevant here, § 1515 defines official proceeding as one before a judge or
court of the United States, Congress, “a Federal Government agency which

36

Attachment to Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft, supra note 34.
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 116 Stat. at 800.
38
Id. at 807.
39
1A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 28, at § 18.7 (noting that although a title cannot be
used to determine whether a statute is ambiguous, the title can be used to provide critical
clues to the statute’s meaning if the provision is ambiguous); see also United States v. TransMissouri Freight Ass’n 166 U.S. 290, 352–53 (1897) (“While it is true that the title of an act
cannot be used to destroy the plain import of the language found in its body, yet, when a
literal interpretation will work out wrong or injury, or where the words of the statute are
ambiguous, the title may be resorted to as an instrument of construction.”).
40
1A SINGER & SINGER, supra note 28, at § 18.7.
41
Id.
42
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006) (emphasis added).
43
§ 1512(c)(1).
37
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is authorized by law,” or a state insurance regulatory agency. 44 And
although § 1512(f) states that “an official proceeding need not be pending
or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,”45 the Supreme Court and
other courts have read an explicit foreseeability or nexus requirement into
the implicit mens rea for § 1512 cases.46 In any event, Congress would not
have bothered to make clear that the actual proceeding need not be pending
or about to be instituted if it intended for the term “official proceeding” to
encompass any stage of investigation, whether known or unknown. Thus,
an official proceeding under § 1512(c)(1) should be something more than a
mere investigation and requires particularity and actual foreseeability of a
specific proceeding. Given the difference between §§ 1512(c)(1) and 1519,
it is correct to presume that the language and structure Congress chose was
deliberate.47
4. Other Obstruction of Justice Statutes
The final indication that § 1512(c)(1) does not extend to drug cases is
18 U.S.C. § 2232, “Destruction or removal of property to prevent
seizure.”48 Section 2232 imposes criminal penalties on anyone who
“knowingly destroys, damages, wastes, disposes of, transfers, or otherwise
takes any action . . . for the purpose of preventing or impairing the
Government’s lawful authority to take such property into its custody.”49
The maximum penalty for violating this statute is five years’
imprisonment.50
Section 2232 differs from § 1512(c)(1) and the other provisions in the
OOJ chapter in both the subject matter covered and the timing of when
criminal liability attaches. As an initial distinction, § 2232 covers all
property that could be subject to a proper seizure order or search warrant.
This property might include (but is certainly not limited to) records,
documents, contraband, firearms, or any other physical item that police
officers could lawfully seize. Just as important, § 2232 is not constrained
by the terms “investigation” or “official proceeding.” Rather, § 2232
44

§ 1515.
§ 1512(f)(1).
46
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707–08 (2005) (noting the
nexus requirement in § 1512(b)); United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 708 (7th Cir.
2007) (extending Andersen’s nexus requirement to § 1512(c)).
47
See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 452 (2002) (observing that when
Congress employs specific language in one statutory section but does not include it in
another provision, it is presumed that “Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion” (citation omitted)).
48
18 U.S.C. § 2232.
49
§ 2232(a).
50
Id.
45
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liability attaches when an individual prevents any lawful seizure of
property, regardless of whether the offender has knowledge that he is under
investigation or subject to a future official proceeding.
Courts must consider the existence of § 2232 before extending
§ 1512(c)(1) beyond the corporate or criminal fraud context. Just like the
pre-Sarbanes–Oxley OOJ statutes and the post-Sarbanes–Oxley OOJ
provisions, § 2232 shines a light on the types of conduct Congress intended
for § 1512(c)(1) to cover. Because § 2232 covers such a wide variety of
conduct, courts must give deference to the structure of OOJ statutes
Congress created. Stated differently, courts must hesitate before stretching
§ 1512(c)(1) beyond its terms to something like the destruction of
contraband during a police raid. To find otherwise would completely
ignore a separate, but equally valid criminal provision that covers the exact
conduct at issue.51
Ultimately, the structure of § 1512(c)(1) and the structure of the
surrounding statutes both before and after Sarbanes–Oxley was enacted
suggest that Congress intended for § 1512(c)(1) to be narrowly tailored to
corporate fraud. Any expansion to drug possession and destruction of
evidence seems beyond the express and implied scope of the Act.
5. Interplay with the United States Sentencing Guidelines
Courts routinely refer to other statutes with similar language in order
to gain clues into Congress’s intent with respect to the statute before them.52
The canons of harmony and consistency discussed below53 fundamentally
stand for the proposition that “[w]ritten law is the product of a more
51
In the case of overlapping statutes, some commentators may rightfully suggest that a
prosecutor as a matter of her discretion should have the liberty to choose the statute with the
greatest potential criminal penalty. Regardless of the merits of this assertion, §§ 1512(c)(1)
and 2232 cover fundamentally different offenses. A defendant who destroys contraband as
the police are executing a search warrant certainly falls within the ambit of § 2232, but this
action does not satisfy the object element or official proceeding element of § 1512(c)(1).
52
Overstreet v. N. Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 128–29 (1943) (comparing different
statutory provisions using the phrase “engaged in commerce”); United States v. Johnson, 14
F.3d 766, 770 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that Congress’s use of “substantially identical
language” to that of an earlier statute “bespeaks an intention to import” judicial
interpretations of that language into the new statute); 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 28, at
§ 53:3 (“On the basis of analogy the interpretation of a doubtful statute may be influenced by
language of other statutes which are not specifically related, but which apply to similar
persons, things, or relationships. By referring to other similar legislation, a court is able to
learn the purpose and course of legislation in general, and by transposing the clear intent
expressed in one or several statutes to a similar statute of doubtful meaning, a court not only
is able to give effect to the probable intent of the legislature, but also to establish a more
uniform and harmonious system of law.” (footnotes omitted)).
53
See Part II.B infra.
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specific structure involving deliberate choice . . . [to] produce a general
state of harmony within the system of enacted law.”54 And Congress is
presumed to be aware of existing law and legislate with that in mind.55
This realm of legislation includes not only statutes enacted by
Congress, but also the Sentencing Guidelines that are promulgated by the
United States Sentencing Commission.56 The obstruction of justice
sentencing guideline, § 2J1.2, sheds light on the meaning of § 1512(c)(1)
for three reasons. First, it appears that Congress relied on and incorporated
principles of § 2J1.2 in the Sarbanes–Oxley OOJ provisions. Section 1519
uses identical language contained in § 2J1.2(b)(3) when describing the
scope of objects included within its reach—records, documents, and
tangible objects.57 In addition, the application notes to § 2J1.2 define that
phrase as including “records, documents, or tangible objects that are stored
on, or that are, magnetic, optical, digital, other electronic, or other storage
mediums or devices; and [] wire or electronic communications.”58 It
follows that if § 1519 was intended to be the broadest of the Sarbanes–
Oxley OOJ provisions59 and it uses facially broad terms that have been
narrowly defined, then the remaining provisions, including § 1512(c)(1),
must be even more limited in scope.
Second, the phrase “substantial interference with the administration of
justice” within § 2J1.2(b)(2) is defined in the application notes as including
“a premature or improper termination of a felony investigation; an
indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon perjury, false
testimony, or other false evidence; or the unnecessary expenditure of
54

2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 28, at § 53:1 (“Legislation never is written on a clean
slate, nor is it ever read in isolation or applied in a vacuum. Every new act takes its place as
a component of an extensive and elaborate system of written laws.”).
55
See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998) (finding uniform judicial and
administrative construction of a statutory definition and intent to incorporate that
construction by repeating same language); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S.
197, 211 (1988) (presuming Congress, when enacting a new bankruptcy law, has knowledge
of judicial interpretations given to the old bankruptcy law).
56
United States v. Munoz-Cerna, 47 F.3d 207, 210 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A]lthough
Congress has chosen to address sentencing policy issues through both statutes and
sentencing guidelines, we ought not presume lightly that it intended that these two vehicles
of its legislative will be at odds with each other.”); see also United States v. O’Flanagan, 339
F.3d 1229, 1235 (10th Cir. 2003) (“We believe this maxim applies with equal force to
promulgations from the Sentencing Commission.”); United States v. Holbert, 285 F.3d 1257,
1260 (10th Cir. 2002) (“We interpret the Sentencing Guidelines as though they were a
statute or court rule, with ordinary rules of statutory construction.”).
57
18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2J1.2 (2010)
[hereinafter USSG MANUAL].
58
USSG MANUAL, supra note 57, § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1.
59
See infra Part II.C.
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substantial governmental or court resources.”60 Thus, the application notes
indicate that the OOJ guideline is to be used only when an investigation is
prematurely or improperly terminated, not merely stymied.61 Again, § 1519
contains similar language by targeting those who have “the intent to
impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of
any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States.”62 And again, if § 1519 is the broadest of the Sarbanes–
Oxley OOJ provisions, then the guideline’s definition limiting the scope of
liability for interfering with investigations only to acts that prematurely or
improperly terminate investigations means that the more limited term
“official proceeding” in § 1512(c)(1) must be construed as encompassing
even less.
Finally, the cross-reference contained within § 2J1.2(c) is one for
accessories after the fact, not participants during the fact.63 Although this
distinction may seem facile at first blush, the import lies in recognizing how
these types of obstruction crimes have traditionally been viewed. Any
expansion of the Sarbanes–Oxley OOJ provisions, and specifically
§ 1512(c)(1), to contemporaneous conduct by the perpetrator falls well
outside any prior understanding of that term.
B. CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION CONFIRM THAT § 1512(C)(1) SHOULD
BE CONSTRUED NARROWLY

1. Ejusdem Generis
The canons of construction also confirm the limited scope of
§ 1512(c)(1). Specifically, ejusdem generis and the canon of harmonious
interpretation counsel in favor of narrowly defining “object” and “official
proceeding.” Ejusdem generis provides that “[w]here general words follow
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed
to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words.”64 The Supreme Court has
traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute,
both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, and out of concern that a fair
warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will
65
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.
60

USSG MANUAL, supra note 57, § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1.
Id.
62
18 U.S.C. § 1519.
63
USSG MANUAL, supra note 57, at §§ 2J1.2(c), 2X3.1.
64
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114–15 (2001) (quoting 2A NORMAN
J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (5th ed. 1991)).
65
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703 (2005) (internal citations
61
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In § 1512(c)(1), Congress enumerated “record” and “document” and
followed those terms with the general residual phrase “other objects.”
Based on ejusdem generis, “other objects” must be limited by the
definitions of the terms “record” and “document.” As discussed below in
Part II.C, even a passing evaluation of the committee reports and
congressional debate associated with the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
demonstrates that the bill was largely informed by the wholesale document
destruction at Arthur Andersen and Enron.66 Given that history, Congress
intended to give “document” and “record” meanings that would only
ensnare corporate fraudsters. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “document”
as “[s]omething tangible on which words, symbols, or marks are
recorded.”67 The same dictionary defines a “record” as a “documentary
account of past events, [usually] designed to memorialize those events.”68
Given these two definitions and the dictates of ejusdem generis, the
phrase “other objects” must be “similar in nature” to the terms “document”
and “record.”69 Therefore, the meaning of “other objects” must include
some documentation of a past event or some tangible thing designed to
memorialize some other event. Additionally, an “other object” should also
have characteristics that permit a person to write or mark on it. Examples
of “other objects” that clearly meet these two definitions include corporate
files, papers, diskettes, hard drives, or any other objects used to document
or memorialize actions.
Courts have interpreted § 1512(c)(1)’s “other objects” as extending
well beyond the corporate fraud context, but have almost uniformly done so
without following the principles of statutory interpretation.70 For example,
in United States v. Matthews, the Seventh Circuit applied § 1512(c)(1) to
the destruction of a gun.71 In Matthews, the defendant was the East St.
Louis chief of police, who was convicted of attempted obstruction of justice
and lying to a grand jury for his role in unlawfully concealing the firearm of
a friend who was subject to a separate criminal investigation.72 The
investigation of the crime and subsequent cover-up included officers from
the East St. Louis Police Department, U.S. Immigration and Customs

and quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995)).
66
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
67
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 555 (9th ed. 2009).
68
Id. at 1387.
69
Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 114–15.
70
See infra note 144. But see United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 603–05 (7th Cir.
2011).
71
505 F.3d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2007).
72
Id. at 701.
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Enforcement, and the FBI.73 Throughout the eleven-week investigation,
Matthews appeared to have actual knowledge of the investigation into the
missing firearm, and he even commented that “the Feds were snooping
around.”74 As noted above, the Matthews court never engaged in a statutory
construction of § 1512(c)(1) and therefore never considered applying
ejusdem generis to the enumerated list in the statute. And although the
Seventh Circuit purported to construe the language of § 1512(c)(1) in the
recent case of United States v. Johnson,75 the court ultimately confused the
requirements of § 1512(c)(1) with those of § 1519,76 thereby further
muddling these Sarbanes–Oxley provisions.
2. Harmonious Interpretation
Even if a court rejects a strict application of ejusdem generis to the
enumerated list ending with “other objects” as limited to records,
documents, and the corporate fraud context, one cannot ignore the impact of
the canons of harmonious interpretation. At a minimum, these canons
require that § 1512(c)(1) be limited to fraud crimes as opposed to other
types of crimes. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. A
court must therefore interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory
77
scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.

And many courts recognize the “cardinal canon of statutory construction”
that statutes “should be interpreted harmoniously with their dominant
legislative purpose.”78 Applying those canons here shows that an unfettered
interpretation of § 1512(c)(1) would be inconsistent with the other OOJ
provisions, which themselves have inherent limits.79 In particular, an
expansive formulation of § 1512(c)(1)’s “object” and “official proceeding”
would swallow up § 1519, the statute that Congress intended to be the
73

Id. at 703.
Id.
75
Johnson, 655 F.3d at 603; see also infra Part III.C.
76
Johnson, 655 F.3d at 607 (holding that “[the defendant’s] knowledge of a government
investigation is sufficient to sustain the jury’s conclusion that she foresaw an official
proceeding when she destroyed evidence”).
77
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (internal
citations omitted) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995); Davis v.
Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); F.T.C. v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S.
385, 389 (1959)).
78
United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Barry, 888 F.2d 1092, 1096–97 (6th Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Havelock, 619
F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2010); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1975).
79
See supra Part II.A.2.
74
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broader catch-all provision.80
Some might contend that reliance on the canons of statutory
interpretation is misplaced because a plain reading of the text provides that
any “other object” can be subject to a § 1512(c)(1) charge.81 They
rightfully point to the axiom that courts only use interpretative aids if the
statutory language is unclear.82 But this position ignores the obvious
ambiguity in the residual clause and statute as a whole. First, if “other
object” were stretched to its outer limit, then Congress would have had no
need to specifically enumerate “record” or “document.” In other words, the
broadest reading of “other object” ignores the two objects Congress
specifically enumerated, which come before the residual clause.83
Moreover, the broadest interpretation of “other object” could produce
an absurd judicial result, which itself creates enough ambiguity to permit a
court to use statutory interpretation tools to construe the natural meaning of
the statute. For example, an individual currently possessing contraband
faces a damned if you do, damned if you don’t situation. If that person
continues possessing contraband, she is criminally liable for that possession
if apprehended. But if that person destroys the contraband, she could be
liable for obstruction of justice either under § 1512(c)(1) or § 1519. The
incongruity of this absurd result at a minimum suggests that the statute is
ambiguous with respect to whether “other object” covers contraband.
Because the residual phrase is ambiguous, a court should resort to all of the
available tools of statutory construction in its interpretation.
3. Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity casts further doubt on an expansive reading of
§ 1512(c)(1).84 That rule “insists that ambiguity in criminal legislation be
read against the prosecutor, lest the judiciary create, in common-law
fashion, offenses that have never received legislative approbation, and
about which adequate notice has not been given to those who might be
ensnared.”85 The same reasons that an expansive interpretation of
80

See infra note 127.
See, e.g., Johnson, 655 F.3d at 604.
82
See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985).
83
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114 (2001) (holding that the broadest
reading of the residual clause would render the specific enumeration superfluous); see also
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (finding the Court must give independent
meaning to each word in a statutory scheme).
84
See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 285 (1978) (citing the
“familiar rule that, where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in
favor of the defendant” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Bass,
404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).
85
United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2007).
81
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§ 1512(c)(1) leads to absurd results and likely fails as void for vagueness86
likewise show why a narrower reading should prevail. Specifically, a
limitless definition of “other object,” and fluid definitions of “official
proceeding” and the foreseeability requirement, would capture innocent
conduct, conduct that individuals would not expect to rise to the level of a
federal felony, or at least conduct that individuals would not know
amounted to this specific felony with its weighty maximum penalties.87
Thus, the rule of lenity likewise counsels in favor of a narrow reading of
§ 1512(c)(1).
C. SARBANES–OXLEY LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 rose from the ashes of Enron’s
bankruptcy,88 which was only the first-revealed instance in a long line of
systematic corporate abuse of the markets.89 In the wake of these events,
the Senate Banking Committee held hearings over a six-week period where
it polled current and former SEC chiefs, former regulators, academics, and
industry and consumer-group leaders on the macroeconomic consequences
of these frauds.90 At the end of these hearings, the following was clear: the
markets suffered from “inadequate oversight of accountants, lack of auditor
independence, weak corporate governance procedures, stock analysts’
conflict of interests, inadequate disclosure provisions, and grossly
inadequate funding of the Securities and Exchange Commission.”91
As a result, Representative Oxley introduced a corporate
accountability bill that passed the House by a vote of 334 to 90 on April 24,
86

See infra Parts IV.B and IV.D.
As discussed below, see infra Part IV.C, the Olympic athlete and the recreational
marijuana smoker are just two examples of individuals who could unwittingly be ensnared
by a broad interpretation of the statute.
88
Midland Cogeneration Venture Ltd. P’ship v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 419
F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
89
Nance Lucas, An Interview with United States Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, J. 11
LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 3, 4 (2004) (“By the end of 2001, Enron was
bankrupt, and as it turned out, it was the canary in the mineshaft. The abuses in the capital
markets did not begin or end with Enron. There were problems in the market—problems
that were broad, deep, systemic, and structural. News stories at the time made this clear:
‘Financial Restatements Up Sharply’—New York Times; ‘Securities Suits Hit Record
Total’—Wall Street Journal; ‘If You Can’t Believe the Auditors, Who Can You Believe?’—
Business Week,’ ‘System Failure . . . This isn’t just a few bad apples we’re talking about
here. This, my friends, is a systemic breakdown.’—Fortune. A number of very major,
highly-regarded public companies, along with their auditors, were relying upon convoluted
and often fraudulent accounting devices to inflate earnings, hide losses, and drive up stock
prices.”).
90
S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2–4 (2002).
91
Lucas, supra note 89, at 5.
87
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2002.92 Senator Sarbanes proposed a similar series of provisions designed
to enhance corporate reporting, impose criminal penalties, and aid audits
and investigations of fraudulent behavior.93 Sarbanes’s bill passed the
Senate with amendments on July 15, 2002, by a vote of 97 to 0.94 After
reconciliation, the final conference bill was passed by overwhelming
majorities in both houses: 423 to 3 in the House and 99 to 0 in the Senate.95
As relevant to this Article and § 1512(c)(1), the legislative history
reveals that the goals of the legislation were many: (1) to combat fraud and,
specifically, corporate fraud;96 (2) to aid in restoring public trust in our
financial markets;97 (3) to better protect fraud victims and corporate
whistleblowers;98 (4) to give prosecutors tools to “prosecute those who
commit securities fraud”99 by closing loopholes in existing fraud,
obstruction of justice, and securities laws that had allowed corporate
fraudsters to escape liability;100 (5) to impose serious penalties on those who
92

148 CONG. REC. 5548 (2002) (reporting the vote on H.R. 3763).
S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2 (2002) (“[The Act] address[es] the systemic and structural
weaknesses affecting our capital markets which were revealed by repeated failures of audit
effectiveness and corporate financial and broker-dealer responsibility in recent months and
years.”).
94
148 CONG. REC. 12,961 (2002).
95
Id. at 14,505; id. at 14,458.
96
The Senate Judiciary Committee report described the bill’s purpose as “provid[ing] for
criminal prosecution and enhanced penalties of persons who defraud investors in publicly
traded securities or alter or destroy evidence in certain Federal investigations.” S. REP. NO.
107-146, at 2 (2002) (emphasis added).
97
Id. (“This bill would play a crucial role in restoring trust in the financial markets by
ensuring that the corporate fraud and greed may be better detected, prevented and
prosecuted.”); see also id. at 11 (stating that the “majority of Americans depend on capital
markets to invest in the future needs of their families—from their children’s college fund to
their retirement nest eggs,” and that “Congress must act now to restore confidence in the
integrity of the public markets”).
98
Id. at 2 (identifying another specific aim as “protect[ing] victims of such fraud”); see
also id. at 10 (noting that “corporate whistleblowers are left unprotected under current law”
yet they are the only people who can testify as to “who knew what, and when”); id. at 5
(finding that this “corporate code of silence not only hampers investigations, but also creates
a climate where ongoing wrongdoing can occur with virtual impunity” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. at 6 (referencing repeatedly Congress’s aim to aid “the regulators, the
victims of fraud, and the corporate whistleblowers [who were] faced with daunting
challenges to punish the wrongdoers and protect the victims’ rights”).
99
Id. at 2.
100
Id. at 6 (“[U]nlike bank fraud, health care fraud, and bankruptcy fraud, there is no
specific securities fraud provision in the criminal code to outlaw the breadth of schemes and
artifices to defraud investors in publicly traded companies. Currently, . . . prosecutors must
rely on generic mail and wire charges that carry maximum penalties of up to only five years
imprisonment and require prosecutors to carry the sometimes awkward burden of proving
the use of the mail or the interstate wires to carry out the fraud. Alternatively, prosecutors
may charge a willful violation of certain specific securities laws or regulations, but such
93
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commit such fraud;101 and (6) to ensure that the widespread document
destruction that occurred in the wake of the Enron scandal was not
repeated.102
Senator Sarbanes’s original bill did not contain the criminal provisions
that were eventually added before the bill’s final adoption.103 Instead, the
original bill was largely directed at the perceived failures of the accounting
and auditing industry to ferret out corporate fraud at companies such as
Enron and WorldCom.104 Shortly after Senator Sarbanes introduced his
bill, the Senate considered two significant amendments that added criminal
provisions to the Act. Senators Leahy and McCain proposed the first
amendment.105 The Leahy–McCain amendment sought to: (1) provide
“prosecutors with new and better tools to effectively prosecute and punish
those who defraud investors”; (2) establish “tools to improve the ability of
investigators and regulators to collect and preserve evidence which proves
fraud”; and (3) protect “victims’ rights to recover from those who have
cheated them.”106
To avoid any ambiguity in his amendment’s
interpretation, Senator Leahy clarified on the Senate floor that the “Leahy–
McCain, et al., amendment makes it very clear that these people are going
to face jail terms if they loot the pension funds, if they defraud their
investors, if they defraud the people of their own company.”107
Senator Durbin added that the Leahy–McCain provisions were enacted
in response to Enron and its auditors engaging in wholesale document
destruction in the days leading up to an anticipated Securities and Exchange

regulations often contain technical legal requirements, and proving willful violations of these
complex regulations allows defendants to argue that they did not possess the requisite
criminal intent.”). Finally, Congress recognized that “current federal obstruction of justice
statutes relating to document destruction is [sic] riddled with loopholes and burdensome
proof requirements.” Id.
101
Id. at 7 (“[Current] federal sentences sufficiently neither punish serious frauds and
obstruction of justice nor take into account all aggravating factors that should be considered
in order to enhance sentences for the most serious fraud and obstruction of justice cases.”);
see also id. at 12–14 (outlining new criminal penalties and sentencing enhancements).
102
Id. at 4 (“As investors and regulators attempted to ascertain both the extent and cause
of their losses, employees from Andersen were allegedly shredding tons of documents,
according to the Andersen Indictment. Instead of preserving records relevant and material to
the later investigation of Enron or any private action against Enron, Andersen [engaged in] a
wholesale destruction of documents . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
103
S. REP. NO. 107-205 (2002).
104
Id.
105
See S. REP. NO. 107-146 (2002) (originally introduced as S. 2010, 107th Cong.
(2002)).
106
Id. at 11.
107
148 CONG. REC. 12,500–01 (2002) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
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Commission inquiry.108 His statements, about “effectively prosecut[ing]
and punish[ing] those who defraud investors” and creating tools to better
detect fraud, make clear that the amendment was designed specifically to
criminalize the obstruction of an investigation into corporate wrongdoing.109
The full Senate passed the Leahy–McCain amendment and the provisions
were later codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 and 1520.
Senator Lott introduced a second amendment that added another group
of criminal provisions.110 Among other effects, Senator Lott’s amendment
created a new obstruction of justice offense that was intended to “enact
stronger laws against document shredding.”111 Senator Hatch praised
Senator Lott’s proposal as one that “will be a comprehensive legislative
proposal that calls for harsh, swift punishment of corporate executives who
exploited the trust of their shareholders and employees while enriching
themselves.”112 The Lott amendment was eventually adopted by the full
Congress and is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).113 Similar to the Leahy–
McCain amendment, the comments of sponsors and supporters discussing
swift punishment to corporate fraudsters prove that the bill was aimed
exclusively at punishing corporate wrongdoing.114
The final bill also contained a substantial number of provisions from
Senator Sarbanes’s original bill, including the creation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to promulgate new rules
for auditors.115 The bill charged the PCAOB with conducting periodic
inspections of audit work and drafting regulations for the public accounting
industry.116 The bill also created new and stricter auditor independence
standards that forbade auditors from providing certain consulting services to
audit clients.117 Finally, the bill created new rules for corporations
including new corporate governance standards and enhanced financial
disclosure requirements.118
The final version of the bill, known as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, was
signed into law in 2002.119 It consists of eleven titles, the most relevant of
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 12,504 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin).
S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 11 (2002).
See 148 CONG. REC. 12,509 (2002) (statement of Sen. Trent Lott).
Id. at 12,512.
Id. at 12,513.
See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807.
See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. 12,513 (2002) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, § 101.
Id.
§ 201(a), 116 Stat. at 771–72.
§§ 301–409, 116 Stat. at 775–91.
38 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1286 (July 30, 2002) (reporting the President’s
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which are Title VIII, Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability; Title
IX, White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements; and Title XI, Corporate
Fraud and Accountability.120 As discussed above in Part II.A, four of those
provisions impacted the obstruction of justice chapter of the U.S. Code.121
The legislative history sheds light not only on the Act’s general
purpose to combat corporate fraud, but also on the meaning of the terms
“object” and “official proceeding,” which form the basis for prosecutorial
expansion of the statute beyond the corporate fraud context. Although the
dictionary definitions of these terms are broad, Congress intended them to
have very specific and narrowly tailored meanings. With respect to
“object,” Congress wanted to ensure that the full range of records would be
encompassed by the legislation. The Senate Judiciary Report noted that
“[t]he systematic destruction of records apparently extended beyond paper
records and included efforts to purge the computer hard drives and E-mail
system of Enron related files.”122 The Judiciary Report further stated that
the purpose of the criminal obstruction of justice provisions is simply to
prohibit individuals from “destroying, altering, or falsifying documents to
obstruct any government function.”123
As for the term “official proceeding,” Congress noted that much of
Enron’s document destruction was “undertaken in anticipation of a SEC
subpoena to Andersen for its auditing and consulting work related to
Enron.”124 Congress expressed concern with the omnibus obstruction of
justice provision at § 1503—the prohibition against influencing or injuring
any court officer or juror—which courts had narrowly construed to apply
only in “situations when the obstruction of justice may be closely tied to a
judicial proceeding.”125 Congress was adamant that “[w]hen a person
destroys evidence with the intent of obstructing any type of investigation
and the matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, overly technical
legal distinctions should neither hinder nor prevent prosecution and
punishment.”126 Given the magnitude of recent frauds involving Enron and
others, Congress clearly intended to strip the current obstruction of justice
formalities away from corporate fraud prosecutions. These new provisions
statement that the “Act adopts tough new provisions to deter and punish corporate and
accounting fraud and corruption, ensure justice for wrongdoers, and protect the interests of
workers and shareholders”).
120
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
121
18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(1), 1513(e), 1519, 1520 (2006).
122
S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
123
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
124
Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
125
Id. at 6–7 (citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995); United States v.
Frankenhauser, 80 F.3d 641 (1st Cir. 1996)).
126
Id.
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were designed to criminalize actions such as Andersen’s anticipatory
document destruction.127
In short, the words Congress chose in these provisions were designed
to close the loopholes that white-collar defense lawyers routinely used to
get their wealthy corporate clients off the hook. As the legislative history
shows, these provisions were never intended to be used as a prosecutorial
fallback when the substantive charges could not be easily proven.
D. THE ACTUAL INVESTIGATORY PROCESS OF THE SEC BOLSTERS A
NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF “OBJECT” AND “OFFICIAL
PROCEEDING”

No less than five former SEC chiefs and countless other former
regulators testified before Congress preceding the drafting of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act.128 Congress was undoubtedly aware of the slow, circuitous, and
often informal route that SEC investigations take. The resulting language
in Sarbanes–Oxley and, specifically, in § 1512(c)(1) likely reflects that
knowledge.
SEC investigations are initiated by a number of triggers, including
routine review of SEC filings, routine inspections, public tips, media
reports, and referrals from other governmental agencies.129
SEC
investigations unfold in stages, and the early stages occur informally and
without SEC subpoena power; thus, the SEC must rely on the cooperation
of the corporation to gather its information.130 The first stage is a “matter
under inquiry” (MUI).131 An SEC staff attorney initiates the MUI by
simply placing a phone call or writing a letter requesting of the corporation
information that would allow it to determine whether a violation of the law
127
See id. at 27 (“[S]ection 1519 overlaps with a number of existing obstruction of
justice statutes, but we also believe it captures a small category of criminal acts which are
not currently covered under existing laws—for example, acts of destruction committed by an
individual acting alone and with the intent to obstruct a future criminal investigation. We
have voiced our concern that section 1519, and in particular, the phrase ‘or proper
administration of any matter . . . ’ could be interpreted more broadly than we intend. In our
view, section 1519 should be used to prosecute only those individuals who destroy evidence
with the specific intent to impede or obstruct a pending or future criminal investigation, a
formal administrative proceeding, or bankruptcy case. It should not cover the destruction of
documents in the ordinary course of business, even where the individual may have reason to
believe that the documents may tangentially relate to some future matter within the
conceivable jurisdiction of an arm of the federal bureaucracy.”).
128
S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 2–4 (2002).
129
See OFFICE OF CHIEF LEGAL COUNSEL, DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, §§ 2.2.1–.2 (2011) [hereinafter SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL],
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.
130
JAMES D. COX, SECURITIES REGULATION 800 (5th ed. 2006).
131
SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 129, § 2.3.
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occurred.132 At the conclusion of this first informal investigation, the SEC
investigators next may decide to seek a formal order of investigation or
their inquiry may end altogether.133 Under a formal investigation, the SEC
has the ability to issue subpoenas and administer oaths.134 At the end of the
formal investigation, the next step is to recommend the initiation of an
enforcement action.135 The corporation is given notice of the SEC’s intent
to file an enforcement action (a “Wells notice”) and is typically given a
month to submit a brief arguing to the Commission that no enforcement
action should be taken.136 If the SEC decides at the end of the Wells
process to seek enforcement, it may either file a federal civil action or an
order instituting an administrative proceeding.137 These preliminary
investigatory stages can take several months, even years,138 but the
corporation is on notice from the very first moment of that investigation and
is expected to cooperate with the SEC’s requests for information.139
Unlike the cooperative, collaborative process that inheres in nearly all
SEC investigations and, indeed most other white-collar or corporate
investigations,140 investigations of other criminal enterprises proceed
covertly and without the target’s knowledge.141 Accordingly, corporate
fraud defendants are in the unique position of obstructing an official
proceeding even before it officially begins. That is, Arthur Andersen knew
that the SEC had requested information long before it had the legal
obligation to provide it; the SEC’s subpoena power did not kick in for

132

Peter J. Wallison, Rude Awakening at the SEC, AM. SPECTATOR, May 1, 2006, at 22,
available at http://www.aei.org/article/24268.
133
SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 129, §§ 2.3.2, .4.
134
Id. §§ 2.3.3–.4.
135
Id. § 2.5.
136
Id. § 2.4; see also Christine Nelson et al., Disclosures of SEC Investigations Resulting
in Wells Notices, SEC. LITIG. J., Summer 2009, at 19, 19.
137
SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 129, § 2.5.
138
Nelson et al., supra note 136, at 19–20 (summarizing a sample of cases that revealed
in part that “the average length of time between the announcement of the informal
investigation and the announcement of the Wells notice was one year and four months”).
139
SEC ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 129, § 6 (explaining the SEC’s position that
cooperation between the agency and the accused is critical in advancing the mission of the
agency).
140
See ERIN M. COLLINS & EDWARD M. ROBBINS, JR., PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE:
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DESKBOOK, § 13:5.3 (2011)
(focusing solely on criminal tax investigations and describing the length of those
investigations).
141
See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 207 F.3d 910, 913–14 (7th Cir.), vacated in part
and remanded, 531 U.S. 953 (2000) (describing FBI surveillance of the Chicago-based
Gangster Disciples street gang, which included electronic surveillance of a prisoner and
audio surveillance of cell phones).
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weeks or even months after its initial inquiry.142 And corporate fraud
defendants are also uniquely situated to foresee a particular “official
proceeding” that would ultimately emanate from these early investigations.
Unlike the early notice provided to potential white-collar corporate
fraud defendants, police have generally found catching their targets
unaware and ideally “in the act” more conducive to uncovering crime. For
this reason, knowledge of any “investigation” often arises simultaneously
with the alleged obstructive act.143 The wholesale differences between a
white-collar investigation and investigations into “street” crime provide yet
more evidence that Congress could not have intended to ensnare drug users
in the web of Sarbanes–Oxley criminal provisions.
III. USE OF § 1512(C)(1) BEYOND THE CORPORATE FRAUD CONTEXT HAS
STRETCHED THE STATUTE BEYOND WHAT CONGRESS INTENDED
As a relatively new statute, § 1512(c)(1) is addressed in just a handful
of reported decisions. Since its adoption in 2002, there have been only
twenty-nine decisions that include a § 1512(c)(1) charge. Of those twentynine, the majority—eighteen cases—concerned corporate fraud, fraud, or
document alteration or destruction.144 Of the eleven remaining cases,
142
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 699–702 (2005) (describing
Andersen’s actual knowledge of an SEC investigation in September and October 2001, but
stating the firm continued destroying documents until it was officially served with a
subpoena on November 8, 2001).
143
See, e.g., United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing
how police watched the defendant sell crack to a confidential informant and brandish a gun;
the defendant was thereafter convicted of five federal offenses despite his attempts to shed
the gun, drugs, and distinctive clothing tying him to the drug sale as he fled police).
144
See Indictment at 58, United States v. Jefferson, 546 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2008) (No.
1:07CR209) (concealing documents related to bribery charges during an investigation);
Superseding Indictment at 48, United States v. Simpson, No. 3:09-CR-249-D(06), 2011 WL
195676 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2011) (destroying computer data related to a fraud investigation);
United States v. Townsend, 630 F.3d 1003 (11th Cir. 2011) (altering correctional documents
post-arrest); United States v. Black, 625 F.3d 386 (7th Cir. 2010) (concealing documents
related to an SEC investigation); United States v. Dooley, 578 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2009)
(altering data on a computer hard drive to impede investigation); United States v. Greene,
305 F. App’x 59 (4th Cir. 2008) (concealing counterfeit bills during an investigation);
United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (concealing records to cover-up police
misconduct during an internal investigation); United States v. Castellar, 242 F. App’x 773
(2d Cir. 2007) (altering, concealing, or destroying documents during an IRS investigation);
United States v. White, 256 F. App’x 333 (11th Cir. 2007) (destroying an audio recording
post-indictment); United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (destroying a
cell phone after a co-defendant was arrested); United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556
(D. Md. 2011) (concealing documents from federal regulators during an FDA investigation);
United States v. Hakimian, No. CR-09-0021 DLJ, 2010 WL 2673407 (N.D. Cal. July 1,
2010) (removing documents after the execution of a search warrant); United States v. Jahedi,
681 F. Supp. 2d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (destroying subpoenaed documents); United States v.
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prosecutors brought § 1512(c)(1) charges based on an expansive
interpretation of “other object.”145 These cases define “other object” to
include items such as a car, firearms, tools, and shoes. Perhaps most
troubling is the fact that courts have allowed prosecutors to extend the
language of § 1512(c)(1) to drugs,146 to cases that preceded an official
proceeding,147 and, in one instance, to both in a garden-variety drug bust.148
As explained below, see infra Part IV, such an expansion leads to a host of
absurd, unfair, and even unconstitutional results.
As noted above, only the most recent § 1512(c)(1) case addressed the
precise issue raised here: the proper scope of the term “object.”149 But even
the Johnson court gave only short shrift to this issue because it found no
ambiguity in the term “other object.”150 Thus, the Johnson opinion did not
perform any meaningful statutory analysis or construction, nor did the court
consider the “object” element in conjunction with the provision’s legislative
Coren, No. 07-CR-265 (ENV), 2009 WL 2579260 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2009) (altering
payroll records during a grand jury investigation); United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009
WL 1688482, at *54 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009) (destroying documents related to a grand jury
investigation); United States v. Garrett, No. 4:08CR00703 ERW, 2009 WL 1086974 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 22, 2009) (concealing documents during a valid search warrant); United States v.
Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007) (destroying a laptop computer during an
investigation); United States v. Butler, 351 F. Supp. 2d 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (withholding
documents related to a validly issued subpoena).
145
See United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 603 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that
destruction of drugs fell within the scope of § 1512(c)(1)); United States v. Fernandes, 391
F. App’x 547, 548 (7th Cir. 2010) (disposing of child pornography during an investigation);
United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2007) (concealing a firearm during a
grand jury investigation); United States v. Thompson, 237 F. App’x 575 (11th Cir. 2007)
(concealing a suitcase containing drugs, money, and firearms following an arrest); United
States v. Ortiz, 220 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2007) (concealing a car following an arrest); United
States v. Moyer, 726 F. Supp. 2d 498 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (concealing shoes during an
investigation); Dolbin v. United States, No. 1:03-cr-00118, 2010 WL 1904528 (M.D. Pa.
May 11, 2010) (concealing a firearm and drug paraphernalia following an arrest); United
States v. Green, No. 5:06CR-19-R, 2008 WL 4000870 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2008)
(destroying a murder victim’s body following the crime); United States v. Cain, No. 05-CR360A(Sr), 2007 WL 1385726 (W.D.N.Y. May 9, 2007) (concealing tools during an
investigation); United States v. Makham, No. 03-30069-AA, 2005 WL 3533263 (D. Or. Dec.
23, 2005) (concealing drug paraphernalia during an investigation); United States v. Wilkins,
No. 05-40007-01-RDR, 2005 WL 1799203 (D. Kan. June 17, 2005) (concealing a weapon
for an unknown period of time).
146
See, e.g., Thompson, 237 F. App’x 575.
147
See, e.g., Ramos, 537 F.3d at 447 (noting that officer-defendants were convicted of
obstruction of justice for failure to report a police shooting; this conviction was later
overturned by the Fifth Circuit).
148
Johnson, 655 F.3d at 599.
149
Id. None of the remaining ten courts that faced § 1512(c)(1) charges outside of the
corporate-fraud context considered the scope of the statute. See cases cited supra note 145.
150
Johnson, 655 F.3d at 604–05.
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history. Yet that is precisely how these slippery slopes start, through
incremental and seemingly innocuous holdings that unwittingly set the
groundwork for an unwarranted expansion of the law beyond its intended
limits.151 With Johnson, that is precisely what happened. In its concluding
remarks, the Johnson court conflates the § 1512(c)(1) “official proceeding”
element with the § 1519 investigation element.152
This Part tracks the evolution of the terms “official proceeding” and
“other object” from terms of art to a malleable phrase that seemingly covers
any type of conduct that could potentially obstruct some future proceeding.
This Part concludes by reviewing a case where prosecutors ignore the plain
meaning of both “official proceeding” and “other object,” all in an attempt
to induce the accused to cut a plea deal in exchange for testimony against
her co-defendant.
A. EVOLUTION OF A § 1512 “OFFICIAL PROCEEDING”

To violate § 1512(c)(1), the accused must have destroyed, concealed,
or altered an object for the purpose of impairing that object’s use in an
“official proceeding.”153 “Official proceeding” is briefly mentioned at
§ 1512(f), but that provision states only that “an official proceeding need
not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense” to qualify
for purposes of § 1512.154
The legislative history and Supreme Court precedent add much-needed
context. For example, the legislative history of § 1512(c)(1) suggests that
an “official proceeding” is a term of art that specifically requires the
obstructive act to have been committed with knowledge that a formal SEC
investigation is imminent.155 The Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur
Andersen v. United States confirms Congress’s initial interpretation of
“official proceeding” in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2),156 an
obstruction of justice statute that also uses the phrase “official
151

For example, the Supreme Court in Skilling recognized that the expansion of the
honest services doctrine beyond its initial core of bribe-and-kickback schemes led to disarray
and ambiguity. Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2929 (2010) (holding that honest
services fraud only applies to bribe-and-kickback schemes). Like the honest services
doctrine, § 1512(c)(1) was enacted as a statute aimed at corporate actors who fraudulently
altered, destroyed, or mutilated records, documents, or other similar objects. See also United
States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing a conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) and noting that the government attempted to stretch the statute “to cover an
act that is not criminalized by the statute”).
152
Johnson, 655 F.3d at 607.
153
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (2006).
154
§ 1512(f).
155
See supra Part II.D.
156
544 U.S. 696 (2004).
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proceeding.”157 The Arthur Andersen Court held that prosecutors must
demonstrate “a ‘nexus’ between the obstructive act and the [official]
proceeding” for criminal liability to attach under § 1512(b)(2).158 In other
words, the actor must reasonably foresee that his obstructive act will impair
some particular or specific official proceeding. Although the Supreme
Court has not extended the § 1512(b)(2) definition of “official proceeding”
to § 1512(c)(1), at least one circuit court has done so.159 The geographic
proximity of § 1512(b)(2) and § 1512(c)(1) in the U.S. Code provides
further evidence that Congress intended both invocations of “official
proceeding” to have the same meaning. Finally, the Second Circuit has
implicitly defined “official proceeding” in construing the definition of
“investigation” for purposes of § 1519.160 The Second Circuit asserted that
§ 1512(b)(2) criminal liability attaches when the accused can foresee an
official judicial proceeding, while § 1519 criminal liability attaches when
the accused can foresee a mere investigation.161 The court explicitly noted
Congress’s intent in creating two statutes that address two different stages
of a criminal prosecution.162
Despite the seemingly plain meaning of official proceeding, some
prosecutors have ignored this critical temporal dimension in § 1512(c)(1).
For example, one group of prosecutors in the Western District of Kentucky
charged an Army veteran with obstruction of justice for burning the body
and clothes of his murder victim in addition to burning the murder
weapon.163 This interpretation of “official proceeding” completely ignores
the foreseeability requirement imposed by Arthur Andersen. On the one
hand, the veteran-defendant could obviously foresee an official proceeding
related to the homicide he helped conduct. Such a defendant can always
foresee that prosecutors will be interested in convening a grand jury to
bring murder charges. On the other hand, this interpretation provides that a

157

18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)).
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005) (quoting United
States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599–600 (1995)).
159
See United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 708 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
obstructive act must have a “relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial
proceedings,” and suggesting that “[i]t is . . . one thing to say that a proceeding ‘need not be
pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,’ and quite another to say a
proceeding need not even be foreseen” (quoting Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599; Andersen, 544
U.S. at 707–08)).
160
United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 376–78 (2d Cir. 2011) (comparing the
formalities of an official proceeding with the informality of an investigation).
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Indictment at 19, United States v. Green, 2008 WL 4000870 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 2, 2006)
(No. 5:06 CR-19-R).
158
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murderer, burglar, or arsonist is always criminally liable for his underlying
crime and obstruction of justice to the extent that he attempted to cover-up
the just-perpetrated crime. Ultimately, it is hard to imagine that Congress
intended for the Sarbanes–Oxley criminal provisions to give prosecutors a
second weapon against accused murderers.
Prosecutors in the Western District of Texas also attempted to stretch
the definition of “official proceeding” in United States v. Ramos.164 Here,
two border patrol agents were charged with § 1512(c)(1) obstruction of
justice for failing to file a required police report after they fired their service
weapons.165 The prosecutors alleged that this failure to report was
equivalent to concealing documents with the intent to disrupt the agency’s
internal investigation of agent misconduct.166 Although the Fifth Circuit
ultimately reversed the conviction as outside the scope of § 1512(c)(1),167
the fact remains that emboldened prosecutors are increasingly loose with
what qualifies as an “official proceeding.” Applying § 1512(c)(1) to what
cannot even be described as a quasi-judicial proceeding contravenes the
plain meaning of the statute.
B. EVOLUTION OF A § 1512 “OTHER OBJECT”

The government is also taking liberties with the “other object” element
in § 1512(c)(1). Recall that Congress used “other object” as a residual,
catch-all phrase in the statute after specifically enumerating the terms
“record” and “document.”168 As previously discussed, the most natural
reading of “other object” limits the statute to items that are similar to
records and documents. Indeed, the majority of reported § 1512(c)(1) cases
are premised on the destruction of documents related to some type of fraud
or corporate fraud.169 But even a cursory review of reported § 1512(c)(1)
cases illustrates that prosecutors have incrementally moved away from the
most natural reading of the statute. For example, prosecutors have charged
defendants with destroying or concealing firearms,170 an automobile,171 a
murder victim’s body,172 tools,173 and a suitcase containing drugs, guns, and
164

537 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 442, 447.
166
Id. at 460–61.
167
Id. at 462 (finding “that § 1512 does not apply to routine agency investigations of
employee misconduct”).
168
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (2006); see also supra Part II.B.1.
169
See supra Part III.
170
United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 2007).
171
United States v. Ortiz, 220 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir. 2007).
172
United States v. Green, No. 5:06CR-19-R, 2008 WL 4000870, at *11 (W.D. Ky. Aug.
26, 2008).
165
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money.174
The misuse of “official proceeding” and “other object” in § 1512(c)(1)
is similar to the misuse of the honest services doctrine pre-Skilling. There,
prosecutors and courts continually expanded the types of conduct covered
by the honest services statute.175 Petitioner Skilling complained that this
expansion beyond its historic “core” of bribe and kickback schemes
rendered the statute constitutionally infirm.176 The Supreme Court agreed
and intervened to halt this unwarranted expansion.177 In this case, if trial
courts continue to allow prosecutors free rein in expansively defining these
two elements, the Sarbanes–Oxley obstruction of justice provisions will
become just as unrecognizable as the honest services doctrine.
C. UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON

The government has recently started using § 1512(c)(1) for gardenvariety drug offenses, which have typically been the domain of § 841 drug
crimes. In perhaps the most egregious instance yet of an expansive
interpretation of § 1512(c)(1), the government charged Lisa Lamb with
obstructing justice by destroying trace amounts of cocaine base in violation
of § 1512(c)(1).178 In this case, local and federal drug enforcement officers
sought to execute a search warrant at the residence of Scott Lee Johnson,
Lisa Lamb’s then-boyfriend.179 The officers failed to bring a copy of the
search warrant to the door, and Lamb refused entry to the officers.180 In the
fifteen minutes that officers were at Johnson’s door but unable to gain
entry, the government alleged that Lisa Lamb destroyed Johnson’s stash of
cocaine with the intent to impair its availability at an official proceeding
related to Johnson’s drug conspiracy.181 Importantly, Lamb was never
173
Third Superseding Indictment at 33, United States v. Cain, 2007 WL 1385726
(W.D.N.Y. May 9, 2007) (No. 05-CR-360A(Sr)).
174
United States v. Thompson, 237 F. App’x 575, 576 (11th Cir. 2007).
175
Sara Sun Beale, Comparing the Scope of the Federal Government’s Authority to
Prosecute Federal Corruption and State and Local Corruption: Some Surprising
Conclusions and a Proposal, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 713 (2000) (remarking that “[t]he
absence of any statutory definition of the term honest services has left prosecutors and courts
to define what this term means on a case-by-case basis” and “[f]ederal prosecutors have
responded by bringing not only cases based upon allegations of bribery, but also
prosecutions based upon ethical breaches that would not violate the criminal statutes
regulating the conduct of federal officers and employees”).
176
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010).
177
Id.
178
United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2011). The author represented
Lisa Lamb on her direct appeal to the Seventh Circuit.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 599–600.
181
Indictment at 2, United States v. Johnson, 2009 WL 3125306 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
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implicated in Johnson’s conspiracy, nor did the police ever witness Lamb
destroying any contraband.182
Lisa Lamb’s prosecution raises both types of prosecutorial
overreaching. Namely, Lamb’s alleged conduct meets neither the “official
proceeding” nor “other object” element for a § 1512(c)(1) conviction. First,
her conduct does not satisfy the “official proceeding” element as outlined in
Arthur Andersen and Matthews, even if Lamb did willfully destroy
contraband while federal agents were at her boyfriend’s front door. In other
words, destroying contraband while officers are attempting to investigate a
crime is never enough to meet the Arthur Andersen nexus requirement for
an official proceeding, although it is a closer question whether Lamb’s
alleged conduct might have violated § 1519.183 The facts in this case are
even more troubling because Lamb was never tried for her boyfriend’s drug
conspiracy, her name was not on the search warrant, and the officers never
produced a copy of the actual search warrant. Each of these facts suggests
that Lamb could not and did not foresee any particular and specific official
proceeding. More than that, an executed search is too early in the
investigation process to allow a defendant to foresee the use of evidence in
an “official proceeding.” In fact, a search warrant may never lead to an
official proceeding. Therefore, stretching a Sarbanes–Oxley statute to
cover minor drug offenses surely could not have been in Congress’s mind
when this bill passed.
The second troubling component of Lamb’s conviction is that the
government unilaterally extended the “other object” element in § 1512(c)(1)
to cover contraband. As a threshold matter, cocaine base and other illegal
drugs cannot possibly be described as something akin to a “record” or
“document.” Plainly, cocaine base cannot be marked, nor can it be used to
memorialize past events. Because “other object” should be interpreted in
light of the specific enumeration in § 1512(c)(1), district courts should not
permit the government to define “other object” as including cocaine base.
Despite what appears to be government overreaching in applying
§ 1512(c)(1) to Lamb, the Seventh Circuit nonetheless affirmed her
conviction. In doing so, the Seventh Circuit ultimately chose to broadly
interpret § 1512(c)(1) for two reasons.184 First, the court reasoned that the
2009) (No. 3:08-CR-30217MJR).
182
Johnson, 655 F.3d at 599 (stating that the government originally charged Lamb as a
co-conspirator with Scott Lee Johnson, but the government dropped those charges only days
before trial).
183
The Sixth Circuit recently held that proof that a defendant “believed a federal
investigation was at least the possible outcome of his actions” was sufficient to sustain a
conviction under § 1519. United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2012).
184
Johnson, 655 F.3d at 603–04.
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phrase “record, document, and other object” is used in other portions of
§ 1512, and that those invocations predate Sarbanes–Oxley.185
Accordingly, Congress could not have intended for “other object” to be
narrowly construed in the context of fraud and corporate fraud. The court
specifically pointed to § 1512(a) and (b) as examples of the previous use of
this phrase. But the Seventh Circuit ignores that this earlier usage of
“record, document, and other object” was accompanied with broader
obstruction of justice prohibitions. For example, § 1512(a)(1)(A) prohibits
the murder or attempted murder of a person “with intent to—prevent the
attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding.”186 This of
course is in addition to the prohibition of the murder or attempted murder of
a person “with intent to—prevent the production of a record, document, or
other object, in an official proceeding,”187 which is found in the very next
subsection. In § 1512(b), Congress sought to prohibit witness intimidation
for the purposes of withholding that witness’s testimony or a record,
document, or other object from an official proceeding.188
But
§ 1512(b)(2)(B) is even broader, as it prohibits the inducement of any
person to “alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair
the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” 189
Section 1512(b)(2)(B), when read with subparagraph (A), is instructive of
congressional intent. It suggests that Congress was worried specifically
about records, documents, and other objects in subparagraph (A), but it was
also concerned more generally with plain objects as seen in subparagraph
(B). In other words, Congress intended for “other object” to be constrained
by “record” and “document” in subparagraph (A), but “object” standing
alone in subparagraph (B) could be defined to include any object. Thus,
although the court was correct in suggesting that the phrase “record,
document, and other object” was used prior to Sarbanes–Oxley, it was just
as likely that Congress intended to limit “other object” to something similar
to a “record” or “document” when that specific phrase was used.
Second, the Johnson court found no ambiguity in the term “other
object,” and thus claimed no need to rely on ejusdem generis, statutory
structure, or legislative history in its interpretation of § 1512(c)(1).190 But
185

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)).
187
§ 1512(a)(1)(B).
188
§ 1512(b)(2)(A).
189
§ 1512(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
190
Johnson, 655 F.3d at 604–05. Despite its insistence that the statutory language was
clear, the Johnson Court resorted to tools of statutory interpretation when it examined the
neighboring provisions in § 1512(a) and the history of § 1512 generally in order to ascertain
the meaning of § 1512(c)(1). Id.
186
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the court never explained why Congress would have explicitly enumerated
“record” and “document,” if “other object” included the universe of
potential objects.191 Thus, an ambiguity does, in fact, persist.
Ultimately, United States v. Johnson is the paradigmatic example of
prosecutorial overreaching. After all, the government contravened the plain
meaning of two critical elements for a § 1512(c)(1) prosecution. The most
upsetting facet of Lamb’s prosecution is that the government could not try
her for drug conspiracy or for drug distribution. Instead, it improperly used
§ 1512(c)(1)’s twenty-year statutory maximum as a weapon to induce her to
testify against her then-boyfriend. This is a patent misuse of Sarbanes–
Oxley, especially when other statutes are designed to address Lamb’s
allegedly obstructive act.192
IV. EXPANDING § 1512(C)(1) BEYOND CORPORATE FRAUD OR, AT THE
MOST, FRAUD CRIMES GENERALLY CREATES A HOST OF UNINTENDED AND
UNWANTED RESULTS
There are a number of reasons why courts should halt this recent
expansion of § 1512(c)(1) beyond the fraud context. First, quite simply,
any other interpretation runs afoul of any commonsense statutory
interpretation. Second, applying § 1512(c)(1) to other types of crimes—in
particular drug crimes—creates absurd results and requires courts and
parties to engage in legal fictions that make the statute difficult to
administer. Third, such an approach results in illogical and unfair
sentences, particularly in the drug-crime context. Finally, reading the
statute in an expansive manner encourages improper judicial and executive
legislating and renders the statute void for vagueness.
A. CONTRAVENING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Congress never intended for prosecutors to use § 1512(c)(1) as a
general-purpose weapon against garden-variety drug offenses. Specifically,
the text193 and structure194 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act both strongly favor a
narrow construction of § 1512(c)(1). Likewise, other Sarbanes–Oxley
provisions,195 other obstruction of justice provisions,196 and even the
legislative history197 of § 1512(c)(1) all suggest that Congress could never
191

See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra Part II.A.4 (describing 18 U.S.C. § 2232 as covering obstructive acts
committed during valid execution of a search warrant).
193
See supra Part II.B.
194
See supra Part II.A.
195
See supra Part II.A.3.
196
See supra Part II.A.4.
197
See supra Part II.C.
192
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have intended for prosecutors to use this statute outside of the fraud or
corporate fraud context.
B. ABSURD RESULTS AND DIFFICULTIES IN ADMINISTRATION

It is axiomatic that statutes should not be construed in a way that
renders absurd results.198 Yet an expansive interpretation of § 1512(c)(1)
would do just that. For example, if the statute is extended to drug arrests,
defendants will be required to continue possessing contraband in violation
of federal law instead of lawfully destroying it, to act criminally rather than
lawfully abandon a prior illegal pursuit. Similarly absurd is the argument
that any criminal behavior makes an official proceeding foreseeable and
thus satisfies the nexus requirement that the Supreme Court set forth in
Arthur Andersen.199
These absurdities inevitably lead to difficulties in administering the
statute, another reason to avoid an expansive interpretation. First, as noted
above, courts must embrace the legal fiction that the foreseeability
requirement is satisfied whenever an individual engages in criminal
conduct. Second, to be faithful to this expansive reading, courts must
presume that “official proceeding” means any possible proceeding that
might arise from that criminal conduct. Construing that term in any other
way would undermine the foreseeability requirements because any given
number of charges can result (or not result) from a single criminal act.
Third, if the type of proceeding must be generalized, then courts must also
presume that the temporal scope of the “official proceeding” encompasses
any possible future proceeding that will occur at any time within the
applicable statute of limitations. Once these legal fictions are in place,
however, the corrupt intent requirement becomes so attenuated that it
necessarily raises constitutional void for vagueness concerns, as discussed
below.200 To combat this inevitable challenge, prosecutors will have to
create yet another explanation as to how a person can corruptly alter or
destroy an “other object” when he has no idea that he will even be caught,
let alone charged with a crime stemming from that conduct. Thus, courts
and prosecutors must engage in so many legal contortions to bolster an
expansive interpretation of § 1512(c)(1) while preserving it from
constitutional challenge that it becomes clear that this is not what Congress
198

E.E.O.C. v. Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 120–21 (1988)
(recognizing that the “respondent’s interpretation of the language of § 706(c) leads to absurd
or futile results . . . plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole, which
this Court need not and should not countenance” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 543 (1940))).
199
See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005).
200
See infra Part IV.D.
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intended in enacting the statute.
C. UNFAIR SENTENCING DISPARITIES

Allowing prosecutors to add § 1512(c)(1) to their charging arsenal in
drug crimes creates vast and unfair sentencing disparities that Congress
simply could not have intended.201 As discussed above,202 Congress has
passed a host of obstruction of justice statutes that separately cover very
specific conduct. The Sentencing Table (Appendix A) attached to the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) identifies approximately
twenty-five statutes as encompassing the criminal act of obstruction of
justice.203 With only five exceptions—18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1033, 1512,
201
One primary purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act was to “establish sentencing
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that . . . provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing.” Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217, 98 Stat. 1976, 2018; see also USSG MANUAL, supra note 57, at
ch. 1, pt. A.1.3 (2010) (noting that, in the Sentencing Reform Act, “Congress sought
reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed
for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders”).
202
See supra Part II.A.
203
See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (2006) (prohibiting obstruction of civil rights and providing
for maximum one-year penalty); § 505 (prohibiting court forgeries and providing for
maximum five-year penalty); § 551 (prohibiting obstruction of customs inspections and
providing for maximum two-year penalty); § 665(c) (prohibiting obstruction of Job Training
Act investigations and providing for maximum one-year penalty); § 1001 (prohibiting fraud
and false statements and providing for maximum five- to eight-year penalty); § 1033
(prohibiting obstruction within insurance crimes and providing for maximum fifteen-year
penalty); § 1204 (prohibiting international parental kidnapping and providing for maximum
three-year penalty); § 1503 (prohibiting influencing or injuring court officers and providing
for maximum ten-year penalty); § 1505 (prohibiting obstruction before departments,
agencies, and committees and providing for maximum five-year penalty, unless terrorism is
involved, in which case the penalty rises to eight years); § 1506 (prohibiting theft or
alteration of bail records and providing for maximum five-year penalty); § 1507 (prohibiting
obstruction of parading or picketing and providing for maximum five-year penalty); § 1508
(prohibiting recording grand or petit juries and providing for maximum one-year penalty);
§ 1509 (prohibiting obstruction of court orders and providing for maximum one-year
penalty); 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)) (prohibiting obstruction of criminal
investigations and providing for maximum five-year penalty); § 1511 (prohibiting
obstruction of state or local law enforcement and providing for maximum five-year penalty);
§ 1512(a) (prohibiting witness tampering through killing and providing for maximum of life
imprisonment or even the death penalty); § 1512(b) (prohibiting witness tampering through
intimidation and providing for maximum twenty-year penalty); § 1512(c) (prohibiting
obstruction through document destruction and providing for maximum twenty-year penalty);
§ 1512(d) (prohibiting witness tampering through harassment and providing for maximum
three-year penalty); § 1513 (prohibiting retaliation against victim, witness, or informant and
providing for non-murder maximum thirty-year penalty); 18 U.S.C. § 1516 (2006)
(prohibiting obstruction of federal audit and providing for maximum five-year penalty);
§ 1517 (prohibiting obstruction of examination of financial institution and providing for
maximum five-year penalty); § 1518 (prohibiting obstruction of health care offense
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1513, and 1519—the maximum statutory penalties range from one to five
years.204 Sentencing for these obstruction crimes is handled in Chapter 2,
Part J of the USSG.205 Under USSG § 2J1.2, a defendant’s base offense
level starts at level 14 and is enhanced by specific offense characteristics
such as whether a certain subset of obstruction of justice statutes was
violated, whether the conduct involved injury or property damage, or
whether the act involved domestic or international terrorism.206
Furthermore, the guideline allows for additional enhancements if the
conduct constituted a substantial interference with the administration of
justice or if it involved the destruction or alteration of especially probative
records.207 Finally, § 2J1.2(c) provides for a cross-reference to § 2X3.1—
the accessory-after-the-fact guideline—“if the offense involved obstructing
the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, apply § 2X3.1 . . . if
the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.”208 The
accessory-after-the-fact guideline, in turn, links the obstruction sentence to
the underlying crime by using that crime’s base offense level up to a
maximum of 30.209
When a defendant commits a non-obstruction crime but engages in
obstructive conduct during the course of that crime or its investigation or
prosecution, another sentencing adjustment applies: § 3C1.1. Under that
guideline, a defendant is subject to a two-level upward adjustment if she
“willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.”210 Because § 3C1.1 applies
to any underlying criminal conduct, it obviously is used much more
frequently than the obstruction-specific provisions in § 2J1.2.211
investigations and providing for maximum five-year penalty); § 1519 (prohibiting
destruction of records in federal investigations and providing for maximum twenty-year
penalty); § 2232 (prohibiting obstruction of the service of a warrant and providing for
maximum five-year penalty); 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2006) (prohibiting IRS obstruction and
providing for maximum one-year penalty).
204
See supra note 203. Maximum penalties for §§ 1033, 1512(a)–(c), 1513, and 1519
are much higher and range from ten years to life imprisonment. The maximum penalty for
§ 1001 is five to eight years.
205
USSG MANUAL, supra note 57, at § 2J1.2.
206
§ 2J1.2(b).
207
Id.
208
§ 2J1.2(c).
209
§ 2X3.1.
210
§ 3C1.1.
211
In 2010, for example, § 3C1.1 was applied in 1,843 cases, or 2.4% of the criminal
cases nationwide, whereas § 2J1.2 was applied in only 170 cases, or 0.2% of them. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, CHAPTER THREE ADJUSTMENTS: FY 2010, at 2, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Guideline_Applicati
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These guidelines were created based on the conduct of the underlying
statutes and reflect to a certain extent Congress’s reasoned judgment as to
the seriousness of the various crimes.212 Thus, less serious crimes typically
have lower base offense levels; as the seriousness of the crime rises, so does
the base offense level.213 In a typical obstruction case, this logic plays out
and the combination of base offense levels and special offense
characteristics align fairly well with the statutory maximum sentences
contained in the obstruction statutes themselves. Similarly, the two-level
adjustment contained in § 3C1.1 tweaks the sentence upward to account for
the defendant’s additional wrongful conduct. But when the obstruction
statutes, and thus the obstruction guidelines contained in § 2J1.2, are
applied to drug crimes, the sentencing scheme goes seriously awry and
shows how Congress could not have intended for the statutes to be used in
this way. A series of hypothetical examples214 summarized in Table 1
below best illustrates the point:
Table 1
TYPICAL SENTENCING RANGE
STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE
FACTS
SCENARIO
I. Standard
Bank employee contacts bank
5 years
Obstruction of
customer to inform him that the
Justice
IRS is conducting a confidential
Conviction
audit of his account, which
Sentenced
violates 18 U.S.C. § 1510.
Under § 2J1.2

15–21
215
months

on_Frequencies/2010/10_chapter3.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, USE OF GUIDELINES AND
SPECIFIC OFFENSE CHARACTERISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 48, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Guideline_Applicati
on_Frequencies/2010/10_glinexgline.pdf.
212
USSG MANUAL, supra note 57, at ch. 1, pt. A.
213
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/
Overview_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf.
214
All of these scenarios assume that the defendant has a criminal history category of I
and that no “acceptance of responsibility” adjustment applies. See generally USSG
MANUAL, supra note 57, ch. 5, pt. A (Sentencing Table).
215
A base offense level of 14 yields a sentencing range of 15–21 months. Id.
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TYPICAL SENTENCING RANGE
STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE
FACTS
SCENARIO
II: Egregious
Defendant threatens to kill his
20 years
Obstruction of
brother’s wife if she testifies
Justice
against him, which violates 18
Conviction
U.S.C. § 1512(b). The wife
Sentenced
refuses to testify, which causes the
Under § 2J1.2
prosecutor to dismiss the charges.
III: Egregious
Defendant threatens to kill his
20 years
Obstruction of
brother’s wife if she testifies
Justice
against the brother in his armed
Conviction
bank robbery trial. A gun was
with § 2X3.1
fired during the robbery, seriously
Crossinjuring a teller. The robbers
Reference
absconded with $60,000. This
threat violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b).
IV: Applying
Police arrive to search a home of
20 years
Obstruction of
known drug dealer. Drug dealer’s
Justice Statute
wife flushes some amount of drugs
to Drug Crime
down the toilet before the police
and Sentencing gain access to the home. Officers
under § 2J1.2
find trace amounts of cocaine near
the toilet and a small amount (half
ounce) in a baggie next to the
toilet. Prosecutors charge her with
obstruction of justice under 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1).
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57–71
216
months

87–108
217
months

15–21
218
months

216
Base offense level of 14. Special offense characteristics: threatened injury (+8) and
substantial interference with administration of justice (+3). Offense level 25 renders a
sentencing range of 57–71 months. Id.
217
Base offense level of 14, which yields a sentencing range of 15–21 months. The
prosecutor wants a higher sentence, so he suggests the use of the § 2X3.1 cross-reference.
The underlying crime is bank robbery, which falls under § 2B3.1. The base offense level for
robbery is 20. Add 2 for bank, add 7 for discharging a firearm, add 4 for serious bodily
injury, and add 2 for loss in excess of $50,000. This yields a base offense level of 35, but the
§ 2X3.1 cross-reference requires the court to subtract 6 levels, so the final offense level is 29
with a sentencing range of 87–108 months. Id.
218
Base offense level of 14 yields sentencing range of 15–21 months. Id.
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TYPICAL SENTENCING RANGE
STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE
FACTS
SCENARIO
V: Applying
Same facts as scenario IV.
20 years
Obstruction of
Justice Statute
to Drug Crime
and Sentencing
under § 2J1.2
and § 2X3.1
VI: Standard
Same facts as scenario IV except
1 year
Drug
prosecutors charge her with
under 21
Possession
possession of cocaine under 18
U.S.C.
Charge with
U.S.C. § 841.
§ 844(a).
Obstruction of
Justice
Adjustment
under § 3C1.1
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78–97
219
months

0–6
220
months

Even a cursory analysis of Table 1 above lays bare the unforeseen
sentencing disparities that arise when § 1512(c)(1) is charged outside the
fraud or corporate fraud context. Scenarios I through III illustrate how the
obstruction of justice statutes were intended to be used and how the
resulting Guideline sentencing range actually mirrors congressional intent.
That is, more serious obstructionist conduct—that which involves actual or
threatened bodily harm or jeopardizes the entire judicial proceeding—
garners a much higher sentencing range. Those ranges are typically three to
four times higher than standard, run-of-the-mill obstructionist conduct.
Conversely, scenarios IV through VI set forth the very skewed sentencing
ranges that can result from the exact same conduct when in drug-based
crimes prosecutors use § 1512(c)(1) in lieu of the more appropriate drugpossession charge, even one that accounts for the defendant’s obstructionist
219

Base offense level of 14 yields a sentencing range of 15–21 months, so prosecutors
suggest the use of the § 2X3.1 cross-reference for accessory-after-the-fact to her husband’s
drug conspiracy. Seventeen kilograms of cocaine is attributed to her for her husband’s
conspiracy pursuant to § 2D1.1, which yields a base offense level of 34. Section 2X3.1
requires a 6-level reduction from that amount, so the final base offense level is 28 with a
sentencing range of 78–97 months. Id.
220
Base offense level of 6 yields a guideline range of 0–6 months. Adding a 2-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 also yields a 0–6 month sentencing
range. Id.
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conduct in destroying drugs.221 Specifically, a defendant’s sentencing range
is effectively tripled at the low end and, if a § 2X3.1 cross-reference is used,
a sentence ten to fifteen times higher will routinely result. These disparities
are further proof that Congress did not intend for § 1512(c)(1) to be used as
a ready substitute for the crimes contained within Title 21, Chapter 13.222
D. VOID FOR VAGUENESS

The void for vagueness doctrine, an outgrowth of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, strikes down statutes that fail “to provide a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so
standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.”223 Section 1512(c)(1), if unblinkingly expanded beyond
corporate fraud or general fraudulent conduct, falls prey to both maladies
that the doctrine seeks to avoid. First, any widened interpretation of the
statute leaves individuals unsure of what conduct is prohibited, which itself
is more than sufficient reason to counsel in favor of a narrow interpretation.
For example, § 1512(c)(1) criminalizes attempts to abandon prior criminal
conduct, a result that most individuals would not foresee. As discussed
above,224 the drug addict who wants to come clean would theoretically be
violating § 1512(c)(1) when he discards his stash before entering rehab
treatment. The drugs are an “object” under an expansive reading of
§ 1512(c)(1), his possessing them is illegal and, therefore, he could foresee
an official proceeding arising from that possession. Section § 1512(c)(1)
also ratchets up the criminality of other illegal conduct in ways that prevent
individuals from weighing the consequences of their behavior. The college
pot smoker who stuffs her baggie of dope under the car seat when she is
pulled over for a traffic violation could be prosecuted for obstruction of
justice when her mere possession would be charged as nothing more than a
misdemeanor. So although she might have calculated and accepted the risk
of a minor marijuana-possession charge when she pulled out of her
driveway, she certainly could not anticipate a federal obstruction felony
charge. Finally, an Olympic athlete who tries to rid his system of illegal
performance-enhancing drugs prior to testing by the United States AntiDoping Agency likewise could be arrested and deemed a felon under
§ 1512(c)(1). By “altering” his blood composition (“other object”) in
anticipation of mandatory drug testing (an “official proceeding”), he
221
As noted above, see supra note 220, even adding a 2-level upward adjustment for
obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1 does not alter the defendant’s sentencing range.
222
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841–865 (2006).
223
United States v. Williams 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (citations omitted); see also
Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2927–28 (2010).
224
See supra Part IV.B (suggesting absurd results).
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technically violates the terms of § 1512(c)(1)—even though his doping, if
discovered, would have resulted in assorted sanctions by the Agency, none
of them including prison time.225
Moreover, the second prong of the void for vagueness test is also
fulfilled because an expansive definition of § 1512(c)(1) fails to establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement and thus beckons
discriminatory application.226 As the Supreme Court has explained, where
the legislature fails to provide such minimal guidelines, a criminal statute
may permit “a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and
juries to pursue their personal predilections.”227 Despite the hypotheticals
of reformed drug addicts and fallen sports heroes, the reality is that this
statute would be used against a much more vulnerable population. It is the
ideal stick for prosecutors to employ when they want to persuade bit players
in a crime to roll over on a bigger fish, especially in drug cases where
proving participation in a wider conspiracy, specific actual drug deals, and
drug amounts can be difficult.228 And because the statutory elements are
virtually limitless in an expansive reading of § 1512(c)(1), there is no
downside to using it; prosecutors can easily secure a conviction that carries
hefty penalties should the defendant forego cooperation or a plea offer.
Thus, § 1512(c)(1) should be construed narrowly as only reaching the
destruction and concealment of documents, records, diskettes, files, and
similar objects—or, at most, reaching fraudulent destruction of evidence in
the face of an actual, articulable, and specific judicial proceeding. This
interpretation is consistent with the genesis of § 1512(c)(1) as an outgrowth
of the corporate fraud scandals the Sarbanes–Oxley Act sought to punish
and could potentially save the statute from a constitutional challenge.

225

See Anti-Doping Rule Violations, U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, http://www.usada.org/
athletes-adrv/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009) (identifying sanctions for committing an antidoping rule violation, including disqualification from events, forfeiture of medals or prizes,
ineligibility periods, and public announcements of the athlete’s identity).
226
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–62 (1983) (finding CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 647(e) unconstitutionally vague on its face because it encourages arbitrary enforcement by
failing “to describe with sufficient particularity what a suspect must do” and vesting
“virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has
satisfied the statute”).
227
Id. at 358 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)); see also United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221(1875) (“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature
could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would,
to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of government.”).
228
United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 2011).
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E. JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE LEGISLATING

A corollary problem arising from courts’ and prosecutors’ expansive
interpretation of statutes is that it creates separation of powers concerns.
Many observers and the Supreme Court itself have noted that the “Framers
of the Federal Constitution similarly viewed the principle of separation of
powers as the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government.” 229 As
such, courts have repeatedly cautioned against unwarranted judicial
legislating,230 although the Supreme Court in particular has not been the
model of clarity in this regard.231 Even conceding that dissenting judges
and justices are typically the ones to play the judicial activism card, it
cannot be denied that the Constitution firmly created three separate
branches of government. Accordingly, courts must be careful to confine
their activities to interpreting the law, instead of creating it.232 The courts’
acceptance of a version of § 1512(c)(1) that ignores the text, structure, and
legislative history of the provision is equivalent to judicial legislating. In
229

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 611 (1995) (Souter, J. dissenting) (noting that
“nothing about the judiciary as an institution made it a superior source of policy on the
subject Congress dealt with”); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 121–22 (1979)
(declaring that judges have “no justification for taking liberties with unequivocal statutory
language”); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (“A criminal statute, to be
sure, is to be strictly construed, but it is ‘not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the
obvious intention of the legislature.’” (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814,
831 (1974)); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 455–56 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for disregarding the clear terms of the statute and
ignoring the clear expressions of congressional intent: “The majority opinion thus enters the
dangerous territory of judicial legislating. The doctrine of separation of powers proscribes
any judicial rewriting of otherwise valid congressional statutes. The criminal justice process
is sufficiently flexible to accommodate ‘quirks’ in the system, through devices such as the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, plea bargaining arrangements, sentencing determinations
and, sometimes, even through the questionable means of ‘jury nullification.’ But ‘judicial
nullification’ is not a permissible way to ameliorate the consequences of a criminal
prosecution.”); Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Groff, 729 F.2d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 1982)
(“The Tribe’s use of this canon of construction would have us amend the 1938 Act to include
an express repeal of the 1924 Act. That, however, would be going beyond a liberal
interpretation of an ambiguous clause or phrase to the point of judicial legislating. This we
will not do.”).
231
See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 890–93 (4th
Cir. 1999) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (stating that judicial activism existed in three stages
throughout the twentieth century, but its three manifestations were quite different); see also
Keenan D. Kmiec, Note, The Origin and Current Meanings of ‘Judicial Activism,’ 92 CALIF.
L. REV. 1441, 1461–75 (2004) (defining the various permutations of judicial activism and
judicial legislating).
232
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” not to create the law.);
see also Thomas L. Jipping, Legislating from the Bench: The Greatest Threat to Judicial
Independence, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 141 (2001).
230
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other words, a loose interpretation of “other object” and “official
proceeding” overrides the express will of Congress, a separate and coequal
branch of government.
In the same vein, executive legislating is as offensive to the
Constitution’s separation of powers principle as judicial legislating is. As
the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “[a]lthough we understand the
temptation to dilate criminal statutes so that corrupt officials get their
comeuppance, . . . [changes to the law] should occur through legislation
rather than prosecutorial and judicial creativity.”233 Notably, courts are well
positioned to stop prosecutors from unilaterally stretching a statute beyond
what Congress provided.234 As has been demonstrated throughout this
Article, the government, in cases like United States v. Johnson, has
stretched § 1512(c)(1) beyond all practical limits and certainly beyond the

233
United States v. Genova, 333 F.3d 750, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992) (discussing the separation of powers
doctrine).
234
See, e.g., United States v. Cuellar, 553 U.S. 550, 567 (2008) (reversing a money
laundering conviction on the grounds that the prosecution stretched the meaning of the
“designed to conceal” element); United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2011)
(stretching a Sarbanes–Oxley provision to cover destruction of contraband); United States v.
Goyal, 629 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (describing four recent
cases where prosecutors have stretched the law beyond recognition and stating that “[t]his is
not the way criminal law is supposed to work . . . . But criminal law should clearly separate
conduct that is criminal from conduct that is legal”); United States v. Thornton, 539 F.3d
741, 747 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and noting that
the government attempted to stretch the statute “to cover an act that is not criminalized by
the statute”); United States v. Salgado, 519 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the
prosecution’s invitation to extend 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a) to cover robberies of federal officials
who hold no money); United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 2006) (reversing a
health care fraud conviction and finding that the “Government has stretched the statute to
cover activity beyond its plain words”); United States v. Hunt, 456 F.3d 1255, 1259, 1264
(10th Cir. 2006) (reversing a conviction on the grounds that the defendant did not “forge”
checks from his employer’s account, even though the list of crimes for which the defendant
could have been charged was lengthy); United States v. Myr Grp., 361 F.3d 364, 366 (7th
Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal of indictment and chiding prosecutors for stretching an
OSHA statute by filing a criminal indictment); United States v. Errol D., Jr., 292 F.3d 1159,
1160–61 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Indian Major Crimes Act did not grant the U.S.
government jurisdiction over a defendant accused of burglary); United States v. Mohrbacher,
182 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (reversing a defendant’s conviction for transporting
visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct on the grounds that a
computer download does not constitute transport); United States v. Palmieri, 21 F.3d 1265,
1277 (3d Cir.) (Cowen, J., dissenting), vacated, 513 U.S. 957 (1994) (relying on legislative
history and statutory structure in suggesting that the prosecution wrongfully ignored the gun
collector exception inherent in the Gun Control Act of 1968); United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d
1546, 1548 (1st Cir. 1989) (reversing a conviction because the government charged under
the wrong statute and the government offered insufficient evidence to convict on the other
charges).
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plain language and intended meaning of the text. Section 1512(c)(1) was
never designed to ensnare the garden-variety drug offender.
V. CONCLUSION
Nearly ten years after Sarbanes–Oxley was enacted, scholars235 and
investors236 continue to debate whether the Act has reduced corporate fraud
or the need for nearly constant corporate earnings restatements. After all,
the Act was certainly no help in preventing the housing bubble, the
subsequent credit crisis, the myriad of Ponzi schemes, and the general
economic malaise that has hung over the country for the past several years.
But perhaps the one certain effect to come of the Act is the government’s
newfound power to charge drug dealers, murderers, and other street
criminals under its obstruction of justice criminal provisions. And given
that one court of appeals has formally blessed this expansive reading of
§ 1512(c)(1), we can expect prosecutors far and wide to continue to use
Sarbanes–Oxley as an all-purpose weapon against all types of lawbreakers.
One can only hope that it does not take the Supreme Court seventy years237
to invalidate § 1512(c)(1) convictions beyond fraud and corporate fraud.
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WKLY., Oct. 3, 2008, at 1, 1, available at http://www.lawweekly.org/pdf_archives/
20081003.pdf (reporting Chief Judge Easterbrook’s criticism of the effectiveness of
Sarbanes–Oxley).
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A Price Worth Paying?, ECONOMIST, May 21, 2005, at 71, 71 (quoting a study that
suggests the aggregate cost to investors from the Sarbanes–Oxley Act is $1.4 trillion).
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Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2926 (2010) (stating that the honest
services doctrine was first conceived by the Fifth Circuit in Shushan v. United States, 117
F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1941)).

